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Abstract
Jihadists  are  very  active  on  Twitter  but  their
accounts frequently get suspended. A debate over
the  effectiveness  of  suspension  has  arisen;  an
important factor is  that Jihadists  quickly create
new accounts, resurging back like the moles in
the “whack-a-mole” game. This causes biases for
terrorism  and  intelligence  analysts.  Whilst
widely acknowledged, little research investigates
the problem. In this study we identify resurging
Jihadist  accounts  with  novel  methods,  and
provide detailed analysis going beyond previous
case-studies.  We  show  that  suspension  is  less
disruptive to  terrorists  than previously thought,
whilst the bias and disruption caused to terrorism
research has been underestimated.
Introduction
Jihadists have taken to social media. Twitter has
emerged  as  their  “favourite”  site  (Weimann,
2014)  and  an  estimated  46,000-90,000  ISIS
supporting accounts were active there in Autumn
2014 (Berger and Morgan, 2015). Jihadists  use
Twitter for a variety of reasons. The first reason
is to spread their messages to a wide audience.
The  second  is  for  recruitment;  the  third  is  to
indoctrinate further those drawn to them, like a
crucible of radicalisation. And finally, (although
not  comprehensively)  they also use Twitter  for
seemingly  mundane  conversation  amongst
friends.
As a consequence of the volume of data, and its
open-source  nature,  analysis  of  this  source  of
intelligence about terrorist and extremist activity
is becoming more common amongst academics,
journalists  and  government  practitioners
(Chatfield,  2015;  Greene,  2015;  Magdy,  2015;
Mahmood,  2012;  Moriarty,  2015;  Ryan,  2014;
Stern  and  Berger,  2015).  Whilst  there  is  very
detailed  research  on  the  Twitter  structure  and
strategies  of  the  top-down,  officially-controlled
tiers  of  Jihadist  terrorist  groups  (Stern  and
Berger,  2015),  we  argue  that  the  field  could
benefit  from  more  sustained  research  on  the
larger, bottom-up community of Jihadist massed
ranks.
Another  consequence  of  how  numerous  and
vocal  Jihadists  are  on  Twitter,  is  the  political,
cultural  and media pressure to take down – or
suspend – terrorism supporting accounts (Levy,
2014; Moriarty,  2015). In recent years this  has
led  to  several  changes  in  Twitter's  suspension
policy, and an enormous increase in the number
of suspensions. A debate has now arisen in the
media  and  academic  literature  on  the
effectiveness of these suspensions (Arthur, 2014;
Fisher, 2015; Gladstone, 2015; Stern and Berger,
2015).  The  assumption  is  that  suspending
terrorist supporting accounts reduces the number
of terrorists on Twitter. It is assumed that this, in
turn, will help counter the objectives for which
Jihadists are using social media in the first place:
recruitment,  radicalisation,  spreading
propaganda and threats. On the other side of the
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debate  are  concerns  over  loss  of  intelligence,
freedom  of  speech,  and  how  realistically
achievable the number of suspensions needed to
make a dent in the problem is.
Central to this debate is another significant and
problematic  phenomenon  associated  with
Jihadist  social  media research:  “many of  those
suspended  users  simply  sat  down  at  their
computers  the  very  next  day,  created  new
accounts, and started all over again” (Stern and
Berger,  2015).  This  phenomenon  is
acknowledged in a  range of studies  (Chatfield,
2015; Magdy, 2015; Berger and Morgan, 2015)
and  widely  referred  to  as  “whack-a-mole”
(Arthur, 2014; Berger and Morgan, 2015; Levy,
2014; Stern and Berger, 2015). Those who create
these resurging whack-a-mole accounts we call
“resurgents”  and  we  provide  a  more  detailed
definition later in the paper.
Resurgents  do  not  just  cause  a  whack-a-mole
challenge for those performing the suspensions.
Their quantity makes identification difficult and
so  they  often  go  unnoticed.  The  impact  of
researchers  being  unable  to  identify  or  control
for  resurgents  is  that  their  datasets  will  suffer
biases; the main bias being replicate error. If the
dataset  contains  duplicate  resurgent  accounts
who get treated as independent data points, this
clearly causes errors in any research addressing a
range of issues: the number of Jihadist accounts,
the  level  of  support  for  a  particular  course  of
action,  how  unusual  a  particular  behaviour  is,
and so on.
An example of a problem caused by resurgents is
Berger  and Morgan's  estimate of the (carefully
worded)  number  of  “ISIS-supporting  Twitter
accounts”. The problem is that we do not know
how  many  unique  ISIS  supporters  are
represented  by  these  accounts.  In  another
example, Twitter claimed that it  had suspended
10,000  ISIS  linked  accounts  in  a  single  day
(Gladstone,  2015).  Again,  it  is  unknown  how
many  ISIS  supporters  this  represents.  These
problems occur because there are no methods to
identify resurgent accounts amongst this volume
of data, or control for the biases that they cause.
One of our aims is to help develop such methods
and provide these estimates.
It  is  clear  that  resurgents  cause  problems  for
suspension and for research, yet academic study
of  them  is  lacking.  Previous  studies  have
discussed  suspension  and  resurgence  as  a
potential  flaw with the generalisability  of their
findings  (Berger  and  Morgan,  2015;  Chatfield,
2015;  Magdy,  2015).  However,  almost  no
research  has  been  done  to  characterise  and
describe  suspended  or  resurgent  accounts  –
partly  due  to  the  lack  of  methods  for  finding
them.  The  impact  of  resurgents  on  the
effectiveness debate, therefore, currently rests on
Stern and Berger's (2015) case study of a single
resurgent.
Stern and Berger (2015) conducted a case study
of the suspension and single resurgence of  the
official  al  Shabaab  Twitter  account  in  January
2013 and concluded that suspension is disruptive
to  terrorists  but not  to  research  or  intelligence
gathering.  One  of  their  claims  is  that  finding
matching resurgent accounts, and analysing them
as  continuations  of  the  same  account  is  easy.
Furthermore,  they claimed the “suspension had
cost nothing in intelligence value... and the new
account continued the stream of press releases”.
Whilst this may be true for researchers tracking a
particular case study account, especially official
media  accounts,  any  researcher  analysing  the
Jihadist  massed  ranks  on  Twitter  is  going  to
struggle.  We suggest  that  trying  to  identify  all
corresponding resurgent accounts in a dataset of
46,000-90,000  accounts  is  so  time-consuming
for  humans  that  there  is likely  to  be  an
intelligence  cost.  Addressing  this  hypothesis  is
another one of our aims in this paper.
Stern  and  Berger  also  determined  the  rate  at
which their resurgent case-study account accrued
followers  and  calculated  that  it  would  take
months  or  years  to  regain  all  their  followers.
They then argued that suspension imposes “clear
numeric  costs”  since  ISIS  supporters  must
“reconstruct their social networks and reestablish
trust” (Stern and Berger, 2015). While there may
be  costs  for  some  suspended  accounts,  this
picture  is  incomplete.  We  hypothesise  that
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because Jihadist  accounts have previously (and
repeatedly) built their reputation and the trust of
the community, when they return as resurgents,
the nature of Twitter means that they can quickly
seek  out  close  comrades  from  their  previous
network,  initiate  contact  and  re-establish  their
credentials. Therefore we predict that the number
of followers of resurgent accounts should grow
faster  than  naturally  growing Jihadist  accounts
who  must  establish  credentials  from  scratch
rather than simply renew them.
We  will  also  consider  other  factors  that  could
explain  any  accelerated  growth  amongst
resurgents.  One  relevant  Twitter  phenomenon
could be “Follow Friday” (Leavitt, 2014), where
participating users  recommend  accounts  (on
Fridays)  to  their  followers.  These  tweets  are
often  signposted  with  the  hashtags  “#ff”  or
“#followfriday”,  e.g.  “#ff  #followfriday
@randomuser1  @twitteruser123”.  We
hypothesise that they could be helping to drive
growth, and will perform an initial test of how
common they are to assess the viability of this.
We  think  that  the  phenomenon  of  accounts
resurging  from  suspension  is  a  significant
enough  feature  of  modern  terrorism  to  merit
further study and definition. With currently only
a  single  case  study,  we  suggest  that  the  next
logical step is to study more resurgents, and this
is the main aim of our paper. However, since the
world of modern terrorist activity is one of social
media  and  big  data,  conclusions  drawn  about
case studies cannot be appropriately generalised
to  the  whole  population  of  Jihadists.  We
therefore, as has been identified as necessary in
the study of Twitter Jihadists in general, propose
using  big  data  methods  (Berger  and  Morgan,
2015) on a large sample of resurgents.
We define a Twitter resurgent as any user who
has created multiple  accounts on Twitter  under
different handles (unique user-names beginning
'@').  Resurgence  does  not  only  occur  as  the
direct result of suspension; some users pre-empt
their  suspension  by  changing  their  handle  or
operating  multiple  backup  accounts.  All
resurgent  types  are  included  in  the  definition,
however,  as  they  cause  the  same  biases  to
research  datasets.  On  the  other  hand  we  do
exclude those who are consciously masquerading
as  different  people  (e.g.  operating  multiple
personas or a variety of automatic bots) and we
consider  the  implications  of  this  in  the
discussion.
In  this  paper  we  aim to  find  sets  of  accounts
belonging to the same resurgents. Once we have
done that, we can study and describe them. We
will  assess  how  disrupted  they  are  by
quantitatively  analysing  the  rate  at  which  they
accrue  followers  compared  to  non-resurgent
accounts, as well as looking at Follow-Friday as
a  possible  driving  mechanism.  We  will  also
provide an estimate of the proportion of Jihadist
accounts  which  are  just  duplicates  and  the
proportion  which  represent  unique  Jihadists.
These findings will give terrorism researchers a
better  understanding  of  the  true  numbers  and
distribution of Jihadists on social media, as well
as an appreciation of how disruptive suspension
is for research. We therefore set out the first large
scale  description  of  resurgent  Jihadists,  a
significant  phenomenon  in  modern  terrorism,
challenging,  in  the  process,  some  of  the
conclusions  about  Jihadist  social  media
behaviour drawn by others.
Methods
1. Dataset
The sampling algorithm used was developed to
bias  sampling  toward accounts  that  tended  to
have numerous links to other accounts that had
already been sampled. The reason for doing this
was the principle of homophily: the tendency of
people to associate with others similar to them
(McPherson,  2001).  This  principle  has  been
shown to lead to highly intra-linked communities
on  Twitter  that  bias  their  interactions  to  other
members  of  the  community  and share  a  social
identity (Bryden, 2011; 2013; Tamburrini, 2015).
Consequently, we reasoned that Jihadists would
bias  the  accounts that  they  followed  towards
other Jihadist accounts and set up our sampling
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algorithm accordingly.
We therefore used weighted snowball  sampling
(Goodman,  1961)  to  identify  Jihadist  Twitter
accounts. This approach enabled us to grow the
sample,  whilst  weighting  sampling  towards
accounts  with  numerous  links  to  accounts
already identified.  A handful of publicly-known,
official “media” Jihadist Twitter accounts named
by newspapers provided our starting point.  We
then manually inspected the Twitter followers of
these  accounts,  aided  by  Twitter's  “Who  to
follow”  algorithm,  and  from  our  analysis  we
identified 34 'unofficial-but-supporting', Jihadist
accounts.  For  practicality,  we  selected  only
English  speaking  accounts.  We  then  used  this
starting sample to seed the snowball algorithm.
We  snowball  sampled  daily  between  May  and
July 2015 (77 days, with power issues preventing
sampling on 10 days). On each day we looked at
all  accounts  followed  by  those  already  in  our
sample. We then sampled any account identified
as being followed by >10% of the users in our
sample, and with <1,000 followers of its own.
We  selected  the  10%  threshold  to  grow  the
sample  slowly,  without  accelerating,  whilst
remaining within a relatively tight community of
English  speaking  Jihadists  (the  principle  of
homophily). While our sample was smaller than
100  users  we  used  a  fixed  threshold  (new
accounts  must  be  followed  by  more  than  10
accounts in our sample). We switched to the 10%
threshold once we had sampled 100 accounts.
The upper limit of 1,000 followers was selected
for two reasons. Firstly, to prevent the inclusion
of  popular  journalists  and  academics  who  are
often both highly interlinked with the networks,
and  connected  outwards  to  non-Jihadist
followers.  Such  community  transcending
journalists  were  liable  to  divert  the  sampling
away from the Jihadist community. Our cut-off is
similar  to,  although  more  ruthless  than,  the
precedent set by Berger and Morgan (2015) who
used a 50,000 cut-off, finding that accounts more
popular  than this  were unrelated.  Secondly,  by
avoiding the more 'popular' accounts, we aimed
to direct our dataset away from the official, top-
down Jihadist  media accounts covered in other
research,  and  towards  the  largely  neglected
Jihadist massed ranks.
During sampling, some accounts were protected,
suspended or had voluntarily changed their user-
name. We moved these to an “inactive sample”
where we recorded all the account information,
but  they  no  longer  contributed  to  the  10%
threshold check. We identified suspended users
by  the  official  suspension  report  with  which
Twitter had replaced their pages. Protected users
had  activated  privacy  settings  and  only
biography, pictures and summary meta-data were
available.  Non-existent  accounts  display  an
official Twitter message that the user cannot be
found (despite our evidence that they previously
did). Although no information is provided about
their non-existence, since Twitter does not report
them  as  suspended  we  assume  that  the  users
changed their handles themselves.
2. Finding resurgent Jihadists
To  identify  resurgent  accounts  we  used  a
quantitative  approach  that  helped  draw  our
attention to accounts whose Twitter biographies,
names and locations contained at  least  30% of
the same words We set out the rationale for why
our quantitative approach in needed, over human
identification  of  accounts,  in  Supplementary
Material  1.  We  then  visually  assessed  those
accounts, identifying and classifying resurgents.
Defining a set of accounts belonging to a 
resurgent
When comparing accounts, we used open criteria
for  determining  whether  they  formed  a  set.
However,  in  practically  all  cases,  an  almost
identical  match  between  handle,  name,
biography  or  location  was  necessary  and
sufficient.  Biography  and  handle  were  the
strongest indicators, whilst location, surprisingly,
was  still  informative  due  to  peoples'  unique
spelling,  punctuation,  and choice of descriptive
terms. A hypothetical, illustrative example of an
almost  identical  match  would  be  the  handles
“@jihad_bob2” and “@jihad_bob3”.
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3. Do resurgents accrue followers faster?
We  investigated  how  disrupted  resurgent
accounts are by calculating their rate of follower
accrual  versus  non-resurgent  controls.  As  we
were unable to  find other  matching resurgents,
we treated all those who had not been identified
as non-resurgent controls. We calculated growth
rate  by  dividing  the  number  of  followers  an
account  had  upon  sampling  by  the  number  of
days  between  creation  and  sampling.  We  used
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test after 
ruling  out  normality  (both  p =  0.00,  2.d.p,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov).
Results
We  sampled  1,920  English  speaking  Jihadist
accounts from Twitter.  By the end of sampling
1,080 had  been  suspended,  141  accounts  were
private, 97 no longer existed and 602 were active
(figure 3). Only 1,858 of the users had sufficient
Wright, S., Denney, D., Pinkerton, A., Jansen, A.A., Bryden, J., 2016. Resurgent Insurgents: Quantitative Research Into Jihadists 
Who Get Suspended but Return on Twitter. Journal of Terrorism Research. 7(2) [In press] 5
Figure 1. An illustrative example from our data of two resurgent accounts which we classified as a
set. They have almost identical handles and almost identical biographies. Their images were not
inspected,  but  their  profile  images are an almost  identical  match too.  Screenshots  of  two user
accounts taken from http://twitter.com.
Figure 2.  An illustrative example from our data of two accounts which we did not classify as
duplicates of one another, despite some similarities. Screenshots of two user accounts taken from
http://twitter.com.
name,  location  and  biography  information  for
analysis.
Figure 3. The distribution of our dataset of 1,920
English speaking Jihadist  Twitter  accounts.  By
the end of sampling, 1,080 had been suspended
by Twitter, 141 had set their accounts to private,
97  no  longer  existed  due  to  voluntary  name
change and 602 were still active.
1. Terrorist group affiliations
The  majority  of  accounts  do  not  declare  a
terrorist  organisation  affiliation,  nor  does  a
simple  content  analysis  allow  for  unequivocal
categorisation.  Amongst  300 randomly selected
users, 39 (13%) provided an allegiance, of which
all  gave ISIS, IS,  Islamic Caliphate,  Baqiya or
Khilifa. Amongst the 261 that didn't,  34 (13%)
gave  one  of  the  four  most  common locations:
“Dar ul Kufr” [Land of the unbelievers] (n=16,
6%),  “UK”  (n=12,  5%),  “Dunya”  [the  non-
spiritual,  temporal  world]  (n=3,  1%)  ,  and
“Somalia”  (n=3,  1%);  with  the  sharing  of
extremist  content  and  pro-Caliphate  sentiment
also common. Twitter also suspended 56.3% of
our  sample,  evidence  that  suggests  they  were
engaging  in  extremist  activity.  We  therefore
categorise  our  sample  as  Jihadists,  whilst
assuming, based on location and content, that the
majority  are  ISIS-supporting  members  of  the
“Baqiya family” (Amarasingam, 2015).
2. Finding resurgent Jihadists
Using the quantitative approach outlined in the
methods,  we  estimated  the  number  of  unique
Jihadist users by identifying resurgents: users in
the dataset who had multiple, matching replicate
accounts.
From 1,858  user  accounts  with  information  to
analyse,  only  1,484  (79.9%)  were  unique
Jihadists.  The  remainder,  over  one  in  five
accounts,  were  duplicates:  resurgent  accounts.
192 (12.9%) of the unique users were resurgents
who owned, on average, 2.95 accounts (a set of
mean size 2.95)  within the three month period
(table 1).
The  other  statistic  commonly  reported  is  the
number of Jihadist accounts that have been taken
down or suspended. This also overestimates the
number of unique Jihadists. Performing the same
analysis  with  the  suspended  users  with
information to analyse (n=1,066), we found only
757  (71.0%)  unique  Jihadists.  114  (10.7%)  of
these  unique  users  were  resurgents,  owning  a
mean  of  3.71  suspended  resurgent  accounts  in
three months (table 1).
Entire
Sample
Suspended
Users
Accounts analysed 1,858 1,066
Unique Jihadists 1,484(79.9%)
757
(71.0%)
Duplicate accounts 374(20.1%)
309
(29.0%)
Unique users who
were resurgents
192
(12.9%)
114
(10.7%)
Mean # of accounts
belonging to each
resurgent
2.95 3.71
Table  1.  Identification  and  quantification  of
resurgents  in  the  dataset:  users  who  had
multiple, matching replicate accounts.
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3. Resurgents accrue followers faster
We  found  that  the  growth  rate  of  resurgent
accounts (n=566,  median  43.8)  is  significantly
greater (p < 0.0001 [exact p-value < 2.38x10-40],
1-tailed Mann-Whitney U) than that of naturally
growing,  non-resurgent  accounts  (n=1,292,
median 8.37) (figure 4).
Figure 4.  The growth rates  (followers  accrued
per day) of resurgent accounts (n=566) versus
naturally growing Jihadist accounts (n=1,292).
The  plot  shows  the  growth  rate  of  resurgent
accounts is significantly higher than that of non-
resurgent accounts.
4. Jihadist Follow-Friday
Having  shown  that  resurgent  accounts  grow
faster than those of non-resurgents, we searched
for  explanatory  factors.  We observed a  similar
phenomenon  to  “Follow-Friday”  within  the
Jihadist  Twitter  community  and  assessed  their
viability  as  a  growth  driving  mechanism  by
testing how common these tweets were. 
Downloading the entire daily tweet output of our
sample  generated  a  corpus  of  approximately
155,000  tweets.  We  randomly-selected  2,500
tweets  from this  corpus;  46  (1.84%) fitted  the
Jihadist Follow-Friday structure.
Although we dub them “Jihadist Follow-Friday”
tweets,  zero  (0.0%) contained Friday hashtags.
Furthermore,  none  (0.0%)  of  the  46  examples
promoted more than one user per tweet, with 17
(37.0%)  repeating  the  name  several  times  per
tweet,  e.g.  “Follow:  @jihadistaccount123
@jihadistaccount123  @jihadistaccount123”,
and the remaining 29 (63.0%) naming them only
once,  e.g.  “FOLLOW  &  SUPPORT
@jihadistaccount123”.  Three  tweets  (6.52%)
also  stated  that  the  user  had  returned  from
suspension.
As  an  indicator  of  whether  Jihadist  Follow-
Friday  tweets  are  significant  enough  to
contribute to re-growth, this result estimates that
there are 2,852 tweets (1.84%) promoting other
Jihadist  accounts  in  our  dataset  of  155,000
tweets.
Discussion
Suspension  and  resurgence  are  significant
phenomena  in  modern,  online  terrorism.  As
resurgents are difficult to find in large numbers,
research into them is scarce, relying on Stern and
Berger's  (2015)  case  study alone.  Furthermore,
terrorism research treats the duplicate resurgents
as independent data points, biasing social media
research  into  the  numbers,  opinions  and
behaviour  of  Jihadists.  We  found  resurgents,
estimating that within our sample only 79.9% of
Jihadist  Twitter  accounts  belong  to  unique
Jihadists, with a lower 71.0% of unique Jihadists
amongst  suspended  accounts.  This  gives
researchers  a  better  picture  of  the  patterns
displayed by resurgents, as well as a scale of the
significant biases for research and estimates and
the  continuous  disruption  to  intelligence
gathering.
With the identification of resurgents comes the
ability  to  analyse them beyond individual  case
studies. Previous work has concluded that there
are  “clear  numeric  costs”  to  resurgents  who
suffer  slow  regrowth  as  a  cost  of  suspension
(Stern and Berger, 2015), contrary to this single
al-Shabaab  account  however,  we  have  shown
that in our sample resurgents grow significantly
faster  (median  43.8  accounts  accrued  per  day)
than  non-resurgent  Jihadists  (median  8.37).
Whilst it remains possible that this might not be
sustained long enough to get back all of their old
followers,  especially  the  curious  Westerners,
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there is  no obvious disruption to  Twitter  when
considered  as  a  crucible  of  radicalisation.
Whether  or  not  Jihadist  Follow-Friday  tweets
help to drive this accelerated growth also merits
further study, as they seem prominent (1.84% of
tweets)  given  the  number  of  alternative
discussion topics.
Our findings could help analysts to put reported
numbers  and  statistics  in  a  more  appropriate
context.  Berger  and  Morgan  estimated  the
number  of  ISIS supporting  Twitter  accounts  at
46,000-90,000. However, we have shown that an
improved  estimate  should  drop  below  36,800-
72,000 (79.9%) unique users. Another commonly
reported,  headline-catching  statistic  is  the
number  of  ISIS  accounts  suspended;  Twitter
reported suspending 10,000 accounts. However,
our results suggest that this should be corrected
to  represent  only  7,100  (71.0%)  unique  ISIS
supporters.  We  suggest  that  while  the  rate  of
suspensions  remains stable,  our specific  results
of  79.9%  (overall)  and  71.0%  (amongst
suspended) may have some usefulness, but that
even  when  suspensions  escalate,  the  principle
behind our finding remains crucial. All of these
results highlight the dangers in working with a
Jihadist  dataset  without  correcting  it  for
resurgents.
One of the implications of this improved picture
of  resurgents  is  the  contribution  to  the
suspension effectiveness debate. A great deal of
political  and  public  pressure  exists  to  suspend
terrorists and their supporters from social media
sites. Although intelligence concerns often take
“a distant  third” place to  business and cultural
concerns, some argue that the intelligence costs
themselves are limited (Stern and Berger, 2015).
Whilst our results do not address the cultural or
ethical  arguments,  they  do  suggest  that
suspensions are less disruptive to terrorists than
previously  argued;  furthermore,  suspensions
cause significant biases to data and its analysis.
Rather  than  leading  us,  however,  to  advocate
against suspension – there are convincing ethical
and  intelligence  quality  improving  arguments
(Stern  and  Berger,  2015)  –  we  propose  using
methods to control for it.
We consider  our  dataset  of  accounts,  and their
suspension  rates,  to  be  generalisable  to  the
unofficial, English-speaking, Jihadist community
on Twitter.  We categorised  our sample  as  pro-
ISIS  members  of  the  “Baqiya  family”  (the
friendly  network  of  online  ISIS  supporters)
(Amarasingam,  2015),  although  terrorist  group
affiliation is almost impossible to assess without
additional sources of data. It is, however, in line
with  the  political  dominance  of  ISIS  during
summer 2015, the nature of the “Baqiya family”
(Amarasingam, 2015), and Berger and Morgan's
(2015)  estimate  of  46,000-90,000  ISIS-
supporting accounts during a similar length time.
Although  it  is  possible  that  generalisability  is
limited by snowball sampling's bias towards the
seed list,  after sampling 1,920 accounts from a
seed list of 34, any initial bias should have been
diluted. We therefore associate our results only
with the general “Jihadist” community, limiting
the ability of our study to make statements about
differences  between  specific  terrorist  groups.
Inspection  of  the  data  does,  however,  indicate
success  in  our  aim  of  using  a  minimum
popularity to exclude bots.
A  potential  critique  of  our  sampling  method
(continually looking for new accounts) is that it
could be biased towards resurgents. We defend
the appropriateness of our sampling, however, as
it  will  still  snowball  into  a  wider  community,
reaching out to newly discovered accounts that
need not be new to Twitter. We would also point
out  that  although  snowball  sampling  cannot
reach  disjoint  groups,  such  a  hypothetical,
unconnected  terrorist  group  is  by  definition
unrepresentative  of  the  ISIS-dominated  Twitter
environment.  We do, however,  suggest that the
best  course  of  action  is  for  researchers
themselves  to  analyse  their  dataset  for
resurgents.  Finally,  our  definition  of  resurgents
also  excludes  those  masquerading  as  bots  or
multiple  personas.  These  are  phenomenon
potentially causing additional replicate biases to
terrorism  research  and  therefore  merit  further
research.
Although  there  appear  to  be  some  statistical
issues with generalising our findings directly to
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Berger  and  Morgan's  work,  there  are  several
possible counter-explanations. Scaling by 79.9%
predicts  that  over  20%  of  their  users  have
resurged  back,  but  they  only  reported  ~7.5%
being  suspended  in  the  first  place.  There  are
however,  three  reasons  why  this  need  not
contradict our findings, nor stop us applying our
result  to  their  data.  Firstly,  they  acknowledge
that  the  suspension  rate  has  dramatically
escalated since,  and in  our  data  it  was  56.3%.
Secondly,  name-changing  and backup accounts
are  also  sources  of  resurgents  and  are
presumably  not  covered  under  their  reported
suspension statistics. Finally, it appears that their
sample  was  not  continuously  re-checked  for
suspensions.  Thus  their  suspension  rate  may
actually be higher than reported. In the specific
case  of  our  Twitter  example,  where  all  the
accounts  were  active  during  a  single  day,  our
findings  may also not  be  applicable.  However,
whenever accounts are reported suspended over
a period greater than several weeks, our findings
may  be  highly  informative.  Again,  these
challenges  only  emphasise  the  importance  of
researchers attempting to find resurgents in their
data for themselves.
Our study included several types of resurgents,
including  backup  accounts  and  those  created
after  suspension.  The  difference  between  a
backup  and  post-suspension  account  is  not  a
binary classification but a spectrum, depending
on  whether  the  main  account  has  been
suspended,  the  age  of  the  backup  before  and
since becoming the main account, and the ratio
between  these.  Recording  data  to  investigate
these  is  therefore  beyond  the  scope  of  this
article,  but  merits  a  future  study.  Crucially
however, a lower rate for backups would lower
the rate  for combined resurgents,  and this  thus
indicates  the  robustness  of  our  significantly
elevated result.
Limitations
A limitation of  our  “Jihadist”  study is  that  we
cannot  make  statements  about  the  differences
between specific terrorist groups. These findings
could  also  benefit  from  more  work  with  a
broader sampling procedure, as there are limits
on  generalising  our  sample  to  the  unofficial,
English-speaking,  Jihadist,  Twitter  community
(snowball  sampling  methods  both  limit  the
ability to reach disjoint groups, and exhibit bias
towards  their  seed  lists).  Additionally,  our
estimates are conservative upper bounds as we
could  have  missed  some resurgents  due  to  the
challenge of finding resurgents amongst big data.
Our  estimates  are  also  upper  bounds  as  our
definition excluded those masquerading as bots
or multiple personas, and our study amalgamated
several  types  of  resurgents,  including  backup
accounts  and  those  created  after  suspension.
Although  there  are  likely  to  be  differences
between  backup  and  post-suspension  resurgent
accounts  (we  hypothesise  that  their  longer
lifespan  and  insignificance  to  followers  would
give  backup  resurgents  a  lower  growth  rate),
testing  this  is  non-trivial.  There  may  also  be
limitations  with  generalising  our  findings
directly  to  all  other  numerical  estimates,  as
sampling methods differ from study to study.
Conclusion
This  paper  marks  a  step  change  in
methodological approaches towards the study of
resurgent  Jihadists.  The  new  methods  give  us
novel  insights  into  the  proportion  of  fast-
growing, duplicate accounts (20-30%), which in
turn  suggest  some  crucial  new  approaches  in
terrorism studies: adjusting numerical estimates,
recognising dataset biases, and seeking methods
to identify and control for the significant number
of  resurgents.  Our  quantitative  method  in
particular, which we hope to calibrate further in
future  work,  appeared  very  useful  for  quickly
finding  resurgents,  and  this  presents  a  clear
example of the wider importance and power of
using quantitative analysis to investigate a range
of terrorism behaviours.
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Supplementary Material 1
Why a quantitative approach?
Manually  inspecting  the  complete  dataset  of
1,920  users  for  replicates  would  be  very  time
consuming.  Berger's  sample  of  46,000+  would
make the task close to impossible. The feasibility
of this  task is  partly limited by its  reliance on
human  memory  capacity.  Whilst  working
memory capacity  is  a  mere  7±2 items  (Miller,
1956),  we  suggest  that  a  more  appropriate
indicator is recognition memory – the ability to
recognise whether or not something matching the
account  had  been  encountered  earlier  in  the
dataset.  Standing  (1973)  empirically  derived
equations  showing  that  recognition  memory
follows a power law with the number of items
presented.  We  can  therefore  calculate  that  if
humans inspected our 1,920 accounts as printed
words,  Standing's  work  predicts  the  number
capable of being held in memory is:
10^((0.92*log(1,920 items))-0.01) = 1,025
Since  for  many  accounts  we  also  have  a
screenshot  of  their  Twitter  profile,  Standing's
equation for pictorially presented data predicts:
10^((0.93*log(1,920 items))+0.08) = 1,360
The  upper  limit  of  human  memory  whilst
attempting  a  match  search  with  our  medium
sized dataset is therefore ~53-71% of previously
encountered  accounts.  Since  each  account  is
actually  represented  by  around  10  words,  not
one,  this  oversimplification  generates  an
extremely  conservative  upper  limit.  Re-
calculating for Berger's conservative estimate of
46,000 ISIS accounts, only ~41-56% can be held
in recognition memory; another overestimation.
Standing's results may also not generalise this far
beyond the 10,000 items used in his work.
To aid the quick finding of resurgent accounts,
we  therefore  used  a  quantitative  approach  to
draw our attention to several accounts at a time.
Hypothetically,  the  simplest  approach  might
have  been  selecting  two  random  accounts  to
evaluate simultaneously.  This would have been
ineffective. A quantitative approach should work
on an assumption or hypothesis about the data.
We assumed that finding matches would be aided
by selecting accounts whose biographies, names
and  locations  contained  >30%  of  the  same
words. This meant that only accounts with these
attributes had sufficient information to analyse.
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